Optimizely Malware Attack Hits 178 Major Websites
A supply chain attack on Optimizely served malware to visitors of 178 major organizations on Monday, November 16, 2026, including Zoom, CNN, Fox News, the BBC, Salesforce and GitLab. Attackers slipped malicious JavaScript into the experimentation platform’s customer projects, so the poisoned code loaded from Optimizely’s own content delivery network with the company’s own security certificate, and browsers treated it as legitimate.
The attack was uncovered by security researcher Scott Helme, whose team found 188 infected Optimizely JavaScript files belonging to 178 organizations after checking 1,611 scripts used by the platform. The malicious code swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment card details and pushed exploit kits at iPhones and iPads. Optimizely says it has removed the injected code and fixed the vulnerability, but it is still not clear how the attackers got in or how many visitors were exposed.
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Optimizely Malware Attack: What Happened on November 16
Optimizely is a digital experience and experimentation platform that organizations use to test and personalize their websites. Customers add a small Optimizely script, called a snippet, to their webpages, and that script delivers the company’s code plus each customer’s experiments. Because the snippet loads on every page, anything injected into it reaches every visitor of every affected site.
The company confirmed to BleepingComputer that attackers exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects. “Earlier today, Optimizely identified a security incident in which an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow,” Optimizely told BleepingComputer. “They used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. We have blocked access to the vulnerable path and deployed a fix. We have removed the injected code from affected projects. We have also ended active sessions, revoked tokens, and reset access for affected user accounts.”
Helme, founder of the security monitoring service Report URI, reported the attack on Monday after his team analyzed the platform’s scripts. His investigation traced the earliest Optimizely script injection to the early morning of November 16, with the first poisoned code found in the BBC’s snippet at 04:21 UTC, about two hours after the last clean capture. The attacker registered the domain 1688360.cc at 05:23 UTC, built the first version of the malicious script at 08:10 UTC and added a card skimmer later in the day.
How the Attack Worked

The attack is a classic supply chain attack: the affected sites’ own servers were never breached, because a vendor they all trusted delivered the malicious code for them. Optimizely Web customers add a single script to their pages, and each snippet holds the customer’s experiments plus an optional field called Project JavaScript, custom code the customer writes in the Optimizely dashboard that runs on every page. The attacker wrote a short loader into the Project JavaScript field of many unrelated customer projects and left the rest of each snippet untouched. The poisoned files were still served from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely’s own certificate, from a host every affected site already trusted, so browsers and most security allowlists treated the code as legitimate. The injected code loaded an additional malicious script from 1688360.cc/track.js, sometimes hidden with Base64 encoding, and one variation could run an embedded copy if the remote script was blocked.
Report URI stressed that the incident was not CDN cache poisoning, because the delivery network served exactly what Optimizely’s platform provided. The open question is how the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects. Report URI says it does not know whether the attacker used a compromised Optimizely system, a stolen credential with access across customers, or something else.
What the Malware Did to Visitors
Every visitor to an infected page received the same track.js script with all of its components active at once. The main component is a crypto clipper, malware that watches webpages for cryptocurrency wallet addresses and replaces them with attacker-controlled addresses at the moment a visitor uses them. The clipper recognizes Bitcoin, Ethereum and other EVM chains, plus TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin addresses, checks that each address is valid and swaps it into page text, forms, links, the clipboard, outgoing network requests and the iOS share sheet.
A second component skimmed payment cards. It searched for credit card numbers, expiration dates and security codes entered into webpages and tried to transmit the captured information to the attackers. A third component delivered exploit kits to iPhones and iPads. Helme identified these as the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, which Google’s Threat Intelligence Group documented in March 2026 and which target different iOS versions. The malicious script also collected browser cookies, webpage addresses and screenshots.
Money was already stolen. Helme’s investigation found that cryptocurrency wallets embedded in the track.js script had received approximately $7,000 in transactions as of November 16. The largest share was Bitcoin, at about $5,380, followed by Litecoin at about $762, TRON at about $719 and Ethereum at about $100. However, some wallets were active before the attack, making it difficult to determine exactly how much cryptocurrency was stolen during the campaign itself.
178 Sites Affected, From Zoom to the BBC
The scale of the attack is what makes it stand out. Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets it could find and found 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organizations, and it says the real number is likely higher because it could only check the snippets it found in time. BleepingComputer independently confirmed that the malicious script loaded, or tried to load, on numerous affected websites using scans recorded by urlscan.io.
The affected list includes Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC in several regions, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock, plus Fox News, Mutual of Omaha, American Eagle, Air France, Change.org, Bitly, IG and UNICEF USA. Other confirmed sites include KLM, Scheels, American Girl, ManageBuilding, Smartsheet, Stamps.com, ASOS, Levi’s and Vodafone Australia. Salesforce confirmed it is investigating and said it is disabling Optimizely scripts across preview and production instances as a precaution.
The cleanup moved fast once the attack was found. Helme reported that Optimizely’s cleanup had reduced the number of infected scripts through the day, with 169 still infected at 20:56 UTC and only one of the 188 previously compromised files still containing malicious code as of 21:52 UTC on November 16. That last file belonged to UK broadband provider TalkTalk. Optimizely said it has also blocked any of the malicious code from being delivered through Cloudflare and has notified all affected customers. The company says it is continuing to investigate and will publish updates on its status page.
What to Do If You Visited an Affected Site

If you visited any of the affected websites on November 16, a few checks are worth doing now. Anyone who made a cryptocurrency transfer that day should review it to make sure the destination wallet address was not replaced by the malware. The clipper works silently, so a transfer can look normal while the money goes to the attacker’s wallet. Anyone who entered payment card information on an affected site should monitor their credit card accounts for unauthorized transactions and contact their card issuer if anything looks wrong.
iPhone and iPad users who visited affected websites should make sure their devices are running the latest available iOS or iPadOS updates, because the attack delivered exploit kits aimed at vulnerabilities in older versions. Optimizely Web customers should open every project’s Project JavaScript and every experiment’s custom code and look for 1688360.cc, atob( and any script they did not write, Report URI advised. For context on how breaches like this spread, read our reports on the Uber data breach, the Microsoft 365 outage and the Workday outage.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Optimizely malware attack?
On November 16, 2026, attackers injected malicious JavaScript into Optimizely Web customer projects through a vulnerability in the platform’s account signup flow. The poisoned code loaded from Optimizely’s own servers onto the websites of 178 organizations, including Zoom, CNN, the BBC, Salesforce and GitLab, and it stole cryptocurrency, skimmed payment cards and targeted iPhones and iPads.
Which websites were affected by the Optimizely hack?
Report URI found 188 infected Optimizely snippets belonging to 178 organizations. Confirmed sites include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. The real number may be higher, since researchers could only check the snippets they found.
What did the malware do?
The malicious script swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones, skimmed credit card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into webpages, delivered Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits to iPhones and iPads, and collected browser cookies, webpage addresses and screenshots. About $7,000 reached the attackers’ wallets on November 16.
Is the Optimizely attack over?
Mostly. By 21:52 UTC on November 16, only one of the 188 infected scripts still contained malicious code. Optimizely says it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts. The company is still investigating how the attackers got in.
What should I do if I visited an affected website on November 16?
Check any cryptocurrency transfers made that day, monitor your credit card statements for unauthorized transactions, update your iPhone or iPad to the latest iOS or iPadOS, and watch for suspicious activity on services you were logged into.
Conclusion
The Optimizely attack shows how a single trusted vendor can put hundreds of major websites at risk at once. Attackers needed no breach of Zoom, the BBC or Salesforce: they only needed a flaw in Optimizely’s signup flow and a few lines of JavaScript in a field most visitors never see. About $7,000 in cryptocurrency was stolen, card details were skimmed and iPhones were targeted, all through code served with Optimizely’s own certificate. The cleanup was fast, but the unanswered question is how the attackers got write access to so many unrelated customer projects, and Optimizely has yet to explain it.